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The great crisis of the 21st century has posed formidable challenges for economic policy-
makers throughout the world. The challenges have been particularly great for central 
banks, because of the importance of financial components in the genesis and develop-
ment of the crisis, and because monetary policy is the most flexible, and, in the short-term, 
the most powerful economic policy instrument, although, as will be seen later, its ability to 
address certain types of shocks is limited. For the European Central Bank (ECB), things 
have been complicated by the fact that the crisis caught it at the start of the complex Eu-
ropean monetary integration project, which, moreover, was based on institutional pillars 
that have proven to be insufficient in significant respects.
Any analysis of the ECB’s response to the crisis must begin by briefly identifying the chal-
lenges posed by the crisis for the advanced countries in general and for the euro area in 
particular.
After the subprime mortgage episode in the United States, the Great Recession imposed 
itself in the form of a sharp and sudden evaporation of world liquidity and an abrupt reas-
sessment of financial risks as a result of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which threat-
ened to destroy the stability of the global financial system. The financial crisis 
subsequently turned into a crisis of the economies’ real sectors in the form of a deep re-
cession, which, in some cases, such as the United States, posed a risk of deflation, and in 
others, such as the euro area, became highly persistent, with a prolonged double dip.
Apart from the conjunction of a major liquidity shock and a severe recession, the problems 
of using monetary policy to provide the required stimulus were further complicated by the 
limits on central bank action which arise when key interest rates approach zero.
Furthermore, the emergence of the marked financial imbalances which were at the root of 
the crisis made plain the significant shortcomings in economic policy. These shortcomings 
related mainly to the insufficient development of so-called macroprudential policy. Attend-
ing to and promoting macroprudential policy required the assumption of new responsibili-
ties by central banks.2
Generally most of these problems do not differ substantially from those routinely ad-
dressed by monetary policy, although it is true that this time they were of a severity unseen 
in recent decades and obliged the authorities to make full use of the arsenal of tools avail-
able to them and to develop new ones suited to the exceptional situation. In the euro area, 
however, serious problems of financial fragmentation arose, which added a particularly 
serious and unprecedented dimension to the ECB’s operational difficulties. These difficul-




1  This article develops the address delivered at the conference “Experiencias y enseñanzas de las crisis económicas: 
Europa y América Latina”, organised by the Universidad Complutense and Fundación Ramón Areces, on 16 July 
2013 in Madrid.
2  Alberola, Trucharte and Vega (2013) review the Spanish experience of dynamic provisions and reflect on the role 
of central banks in preserving financial stability in the euro area.
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that retain full sovereignty in the use of other economic policy instruments in the fiscal, 
structural and other areas, including those of regulation, supervision and, where applica-
ble, the restructuring of their respective financial systems.
The fragmentation of euro area financial markets was also linked to the perception of the 
shortcomings of the institutional and governance framework in the original design of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which reached the point of creating a risk of break-
up or reversibility of the single currency. In fragmented financial markets, monetary policy 
stimuli do not pass through in equal measure to all member countries.3 The deterioration 
of the transmission mechanism gave rise to very special complexities for the ECB.
Obviously the ability of central banks to use monetary policy to address the challenges 
posed by a crisis like the one described will always be limited. The current crisis has struc-
tural components relating to the efficient allocation of resources and distributive compo-
nents derived from income transfers between countries or sectors, against which mone-
tary policy has no capacity to act. In fact monetary policy on its own, even deployed to its 
full extent, is unable to address the macroeconomic problems that come most specifically 
within its scope of action without support from other areas of economic policy, such as 
budgetary policy, particularly when there are problems of private-sector over-indebted-
ness and public-debt sustainability. It is well known that for monetary policy to be effec-
tive, even in the pursuit of price stability, it is essential to have sustainable public finances 
and therefore a regime of monetary dominance. In short, when the risk factors lie beyond 
its scope, monetary policy can merely buy time to allow other components of economic 
policy to act in the required direction and with the required force.
These limitations are especially severe in the case of the ECB which has no single inter-
locutor responsible for the other components of economic policy, but rather 17 sovereign 
states answerable to their national parliaments. This unique state of affairs is particularly 
important for interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. The particular design of 
EMU means that the ECB cannot, without the explicit acceptance of the national parlia-
ments, undertake operations that may involve risk mutualisation or income transfers be-
tween member countries. The ECB may not interfere in inter-country income transfers, let 
alone make up for the lack of solidarity measures between Member States when national 
parliaments are not prepared to adopt such measures within the specific scope of their 
own powers. Transferring income between countries is not a function that can be assumed 
by a central bank, because it would come into conflict with the integrity and efficacy of 
monetary policy and with the democratic legitimacy required by the constitutions of the 
member countries and the Union treaties. The only risks that the ECB may assume are 
those that arise strictly from pursuit of the monetary policy objectives with which it has 
been entrusted.
The ECB deserves recognition for having been the first central bank to respond to the sud-
den increase in risk aversion and the indiscriminate spread of distrust between financial 
intermediaries prompted by Lehman Brothers with massive injections of liquidity. Other 
central banks followed suit and the palliative effect was sufficient to prevent the wave of 
paralysis in the interbank market from leading to a general financial collapse (see Chart 1).4 
With its emergency liquidity-providing measures the ECB was able to make up for the 




3  See Box 4.1 of the Annual Report of the Banco de España (2012).
4  A more detailed description of the actions of the ECB, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England 
between 2007 and 2009 may be found in Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010).
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practical disappearance of the interbank market by taking on the role of principal money 
market actor. As a result, a large proportion of the transactions previously entered into di-
rectly between financial intermediaries were moved onto the ECB’s balance sheet. In very 
simple terms, institutions with surplus liquidity preferred to deposit it with the ECB rather 
than assuming risks vis-à-vis other counterparts, and the ECB, in turn, was practically the 
only remaining supplier of liquidity to institutions that needed it. The performance of this 
function led to a significant increase in the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, which 
had to be expanded further as the development of the financial crisis closed off other 
means of financing for monetary financial institutions in the wholesale markets and when, 
as seen below, the euro crisis later led to the drying up of funding for some vulnerable euro 
area countries.
The operational design of the ECB was particularly well equipped to articulate this type 
of reaction. Other central banks had to modify their operational frameworks to make 
them more similar to that of the ECB, which dealt with a very large number of counter-
parts and accepted a very wide range of collateral. Yet, in attempting to ensure that its 
monetary policy stance reached the whole of the euro area economy, the ECB also had 
to innovate, modifying its tender procedures to enable fixed-rate tenders of unlimited 
amounts of liquidity to be conducted, widening the range of eligible collateral and eas-
ing the eligibility criteria, lengthening the maturities of monetary policy loans and de-
signing new liquidity facilities to satisfy specific needs. Also, currency swaps were ar-
ranged with other central banks so that liquidity facilities could be offered in foreign 
currency.
Many of these innovations were introduced gradually in response to the needs that arose 
as the crisis spread and persisted. The easing of the collateral policy relieved the banks’ 
liquidity constraints by offering them greater opportunities to mobilise assets whose mar-
kets had seized up and transform them into liquidity. Successive extensions to the period 
during which the ECB promised to maintain unlimited tenders and the lengthening of the 
maturities of liquidity providing loans, from three months to three years, helped to relieve 
uncertainty, by reassuring intermediaries that they could rely on central bank refinancing 
transactions for prolonged periods of time.
Purchases of securities, issued by both the private and public sectors, also played an 
important role in the expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet. Two successive programmes 
to purchase covered bonds were launched and a further one for outright purchases of 
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government bonds of countries under stress (SMP, Securities Market Programme), with 
the limited aim of re-establishing the transmission of monetary policy. Admittedly, when the 
composition of the expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet is compared with that of the bal-
ance sheets of other central banks during the crisis (especially of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan), the most notable difference is the 
lower relative weight of securities purchases, especially of government securities, com-
pared with the much more important role of lending to credit institutions (see Chart 1). 
This is an important difference, which is related to the initial features of the operational 
frameworks, but above all to the ECB’s unique status, mentioned above, as the central 
bank of 17 countries.
Non-standard measures to satisfy the increased preference for liquidity and to facilitate 
the transmission of the monetary policy stance to agents’ final spending decisions were 
introduced in parallel with an easing of monetary conditions, given the weakness of de-
mand and activity in the area and the anchoring of inflation expectations in line with the 
ECB’s price stability mandate (see Chart 2). The extraordinarily expansionary monetary 
policy stance eventually adopted was intended to create conditions more conducive to 
sustaining the momentum of private investment and consumption expenditure and to as-
sisting many agents with their ongoing deleveraging. However, the required monetary eas-
ing ran into two major problems. First, the limit on the margin for manoeuvre, which arises 
when key interest rates approach zero and, second, the breakdown of monetary policy 
transmission as a consequence of the area’s financial fragmentation.
When monetary policy loan tenders are conducted at fixed rates and for unlimited amounts, 
as has been the case since the start of the crisis, the reference for monetary policy trans-
mission is established by the lower part of the corridor defined by the ECB’s deposit and 
credit facilities, i.e. the part between the deposit facility and the rate on the ECB’s refinanc-
ing operations. Since July 2012, the deposit facility rate has been standing at zero, while 
the main refinancing rate was reduced to 1% on 8 December 2011, to 0.75% on 5 July 
2012 and to 0.5% on 2 May 2013. To avoid a negative deposit facility rate and to keep the 
corridor symmetric around the main refinancing operations rate, the marginal lending facil-
ity rates have been moving in such a way that the width of the corridor has been narrow-
ing. With these movements in conventional instruments, the ECB has, like other central 
banks, approached the so-called zero lower bound. The absence of deflationary risks in 
the euro area and differences in the timing of the cycle, which meant that the area initially 
faced the crisis with higher rates, explain why in the euro area the approach to the limit has 
taken place later. Apart from these circumstantial differences, it is worth examining the 
different operational modalities with which the various areas have addressed this con-
straint and the reasons underlying them. Basically three instruments are identified in the 
literature for dealing with this anomalous situation: negative interest rates, forward guid-
ance and quantitative easing, considering both the expansion and the change in the com-
position of the central bank’s balance sheet.5 We shall now consider the specific details of 
the ECB’s recourse to these instruments.6
Monetary expansion
and the zero interest rate 
bound
5  Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) outlined these monetary policy options in response to the debate at the beginning 
of the century regarding the Japanese problems and deflationary fears in the United States. In the same context, 
Eggertsson y Woodford (2003, 2004) developed a theoretical justification for the crucial role that expectations 
regarding the conduct of monetary policy may play when the official interest rate is close to zero. In the current 
context, Woodford (2012) reviews the available theoretical arguments and the conditions under which one might 
expect greater effectiveness of these non-conventional dimensions of monetary policy.
6  A comparative description of the non-conventional measures deployed by the central banks of the developed 
countries in order to restore the financial system’s intermediation function and stimulate the economy may be 
consulted in IMF (2013).
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There is limited scope for recourse to negative interest rates and they may introduce some 
distortions into the functioning of the money markets, so they have been used on very rare 
occasions and with inconclusive results. That said, they may send a powerful signal re-
garding monetary policy intentions and, in the case of the euro area, they could help to 
rebalance the incentives between institutions or areas with excess liquidity and those suf-
fering a shortfall. For this reason, the ECB has carried out the preparatory work necessary 
to be able to set negative deposit facility rates and has announced that it remains open to 
their possible implementation if the situation so requires. Thus, recourse to negative inter-
est rates can be said to be part of the ECB’s arsenal of instruments.
Recourse to forward guidance on the behaviour of short-term interest rates seeks to di-
rectly impact the formation of expectations and, therefore, the slope of the yield curve, 
lowering long-term interest rates so as to generate incentives to spend or acquire risky 
assets. The Federal Reserve System is the central bank that has taken this strategy fur-
thest, starting with general messages that key rates would be kept close to zero for as long 
as necessary, it later linked this period to certain quantitative references relating to the 
behaviour of unemployment. This step is, doubtless, linked to the uniqueness of the Fed’s 
dual mandate, in which price stability and the fight against unemployment are explicitly 
mentioned. In the case of the ECB, recourse to this option has resulted in important in-
novations in communication. From repeating the message that it was reluctant to make 
any prior commitments, the ECB switched to stressing that its monetary policy would re-
main expansionary for as long as necessary. Then, at the meeting of 4 July 2013 an ex-
plicit forward guidance formula was adopted, by adding that the Governing Council ex-
pected that key ECB interest rates would remain at present or lower levels for an extended 
period of time.7 This is, therefore, one of the instruments that the ECB is using.
Where the differences are most notable is in relation to quantitative easing, which con-
sists of large-scale purchases of bonds – primarily government bonds – on the second-
ary market in order to impact the interest rates on these instruments directly and, thus, 
the slope of the yield curve. Quantitative easing has been the main factor driving the 
expansion of the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve System and of the Bank of 
England, as seen in Chart 1.8 The most aggressive version of this type of action has 
been that recently adopted by the Bank of Japan, given the magnitude of the purchase 
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7  The rationale for the Governing Council’s decision to provide forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates is 
explained in the box of the editorial of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin of July 2013.
8  See Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) for an exposition and theoretical justification of the effectiveness of this type of 
measure.
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mentioned above, the ECB has implemented several securities purchase programmes 
(SMPs) which include, in moderate amounts and subject to strict conditions, outright 
secondary market purchases of the government bonds of certain Member States. How-
ever, the motivation for recourse to this mode of operation is not – nor could it be – a 
general reduction in the long-term cost of financing for the public sector. The ECB’s 
unique status as the central bank of 17 sovereign countries prevents it from undertaking 
quantitative easing operations like those implemented by other central banks, because 
they would involve directly assuming the mutualisation of risks and the possibility of 
making income transfers between such countries, without the acceptance or approval 
of their respective parliaments. The purpose of possible government bond purchases in 
the secondary market by the ECB can only relate to the specific euro area problem of 
possible financial fragmentation and the distortion that this introduces into monetary 
policy transmission.9
Two specific problems the ECB has had to address, of enormous significance, are financial 
fragmentation and doubts regarding the sustainability of monetary integration.10 These 
problems have had a decisive influence over the entire economic policy of the euro area, 
and very particularly its monetary policy (see Chart 3). Many of the non-standard measures 
adopted to meet the huge liquidity needs have also had as a central concern recovery of 
lost integration and minimising the risk of a euro break-up. The heightening of tensions in 
summer 2012 forced the ECB to announce the launch of exceptional mechanisms to es-
cape the vicious circle of expectations of possible euro break-up that risked becoming 
self-fulfilling. This was the reason for the announcement (and design and preparation) of 
the outright monetary transactions (OMT) programme.
Fundamental to understanding the specific role and limited capacity of the non-standard 
operations undertaken by the ECB in order to overcome the financial fragmentation of the 
area is a diagnosis of the euro area crisis.11 In short, the crisis has two roots. First, in many 
countries economic policy-makers did not adopt the policies to ensure macroeconomic 
stability that belonging to the euro area necessitated; and the financial markets, in turn, 
failed to penalise the mistaken policies and to exercise the disciplinary function that is 
expected from them. Thus, significant imbalances built up and suddenly came to light 
when the economic crisis put a stop to the exuberant growth that had until then helped to 
hide the underlying problems.
Second, the crisis has been the result of a set of weaknesses inherent in the initial institu-
tional design of the Monetary Union. This design included a single monetary policy, ac-
companied by coordination and mutual vigilance in other areas of economic policy that 
was much more diffuse and barely effective. The most notorious example, in the area of 
budgetary stability, was the almost complete unworkability of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. The instruments established to coordinate other structural, regulatory or financial 
policies were even weaker. And all this was compounded by the total absence of appropri-
ate mechanisms to manage systemic crises affecting the area as a whole, so that when 
tensions mounted it was not possible to act sufficiently rapidly. The Economic and Mon-
etary Union was indeed a monetary union, but hardly an economic one.
Fragmentation of the euro 
area and breakdown
of the transmission 
mechanism of the single 
monetary policy
 9  Millaruelo and del Río (2013) and Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2013) review the ECB’s non-conventional meas-
ures during the different phases of the crisis and their links to the institutional framework of the euro area and 
the characteristics of its financial system.
10  A broad compilation and analysis of the most important indicators of financial integration in the euro area can 
be found in the ECB’s report on financial integration. See ECB (2012 and 2013).
11  For further details see Chapter 2 of the Annual Report, Banco de España (2012).
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The size of the imbalances that built up, and then erupted during the crisis, is sufficient in 
itself to indicate the gravity of EMU’s design failures. One of the most serious consequenc-
es was the creation of a vicious circle between the deterioration in the macroeconomic 
outlook, financial risks and sovereign debt risks, which fuelled each other and spread from 
one vulnerable country to another, with very little scope for the European authorities to 
react. The point was reached where this negative feedback loop led some analysts to 
question the very survival of the euro, at least in its current configuration and with its cur-
rent borders. The prospects that the debts of some governments and some companies 
situated in these countries could not be settled in euro had gained traction. Some interna-
tional investors began to sell the sovereign bonds of certain peripheral countries or the 
securities issued by private institutions domiciled in them. Germany became the safe ha-
ven and attracted flows of funds, which widened the interest rate spreads and reduced the 
availability of credit, increasing its cost, thereby deepening the financial cracks in the area. 
The developments in the Target balances of the Eurosystem central banks became the 
most visible evidence of this fragmentation (see Chart 4).
This dangerous feedback loop was halted by action on three fronts. First, the national 
governments most directly affected by confidence and credibility problems stepped up 
their economic adjustment processes and structural reform programmes. For example, 
the approval by the Troika of the progress made in Greece to comply with its programme 
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clearly helped to ease market tensions. A second front on which action was necessary to 
overcome the euro crisis was in the specific area of monetary policy. While monetary pol-
icy clearly does not have the capacity or the authority to resolve the fundamental problems 
underlying the crisis, it is also clear that the ECB’s passivity in the face of the gravity of the 
expectations being generated and the extent of the breakdown in transmission of the sin-
gle monetary policy would have precipitated catastrophe. In these circumstances, the ac-
tivation of extraordinary measures confirming the ECB’s commitment to preserving the 
single currency and to restoring monetary transmission was essential to achieving its ob-
jective of monetary stability. The scope of the challenges faced justified an extension of 
the menu of non-standard monetary policy operations to include the OMT programme, 
which envisages the possibility of purchasing the sovereign bonds of countries subject to 
unfounded expectations that they will abandon the euro.
OMTs cannot be compared to specific quantitative easing instruments. Rather, their pur-
pose is to combat the tail risk of an eventual euro break-up and of blockage in the trans-
mission of monetary policy to the peripheral countries. In line with this view, OMTs are 
subject to strong conditionality, so they cannot be understood as a replacement for the 
reform drive needed in countries with imbalances. As shown by numerous financial indica-
tors and as is generally acknowledged by analysts, the mere announcement of OMTs has 
been very effective in achieving their objective (see Chart 5).
In any case, a lasting solution for the problems that emerged depends to a great extent on 
action on the third front, namely the measures the European authorities need to take to 
reform and strengthen euro governance and to facilitate the path from an exclusively mon-
etary union towards a more genuine economic union, according to the route map ap-
proved by the European Council. These involve a banking union, an economic union, a 
fiscal union and a strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of the whole process, which 
may be understood as a kind of political union.
As regards action by the ECB, the steps needed to establish a banking union are espe-
cially important. This is because such a union would have a very direct impact on the 
fragmentation problems and break-up risks that have distorted monetary policy transmis-
sion. Moreover, the ECB itself has been assigned the role of single supervisor, and this role 
The banking union
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– along with the establishment of a single resolution mechanism and the harmonisation of 
deposit guarantee systems – is one of the fundamental ingredients of a banking union. In 
principle, EMU’s special architecture did not provide for the attribution of banking supervi-
sion functions to the ECB, despite the fact that they are a central bank responsibility in 
many countries. Yet, reasons of urgency and the difficulty of reforming the treaties to es-
tablish appropriate provisions for setting up a European single supervisory institution from 
scratch meant that the best way forward was to use the leeway offered by the current 
treaties to build upon the one European institution with the capacity and independence to 
perform this function, by broadly interpreting the functions that the European Council was 
authorised to assign to the ECB.
Rapid progress towards a banking union – one of the most important decisions taken by 
the European authorities to strengthen EMU in order to sever the negative feedback loop 
of summer 2012 – was an unavoidable response to some of the serious malfunctions be-
setting the euro. A banking union is required to break the vicious circle between banking 
risk and sovereign risk and to achieve the degree of financial integration appropriate for 
the existence of a currency, so that the banks of the area are on an equal footing to com-
pete for capital and funds, on the basis of their solvency and business model alone, irre-
spective of the country in which they are domiciled. These are essential conditions to en-
sure that an appropriate transmission of monetary policy permits its stimuli to reach all 
member countries alike, although that is not to say that interest rates would have to be as 
uniform as they were during the period in which the serious imbalances that ended in crisis 
built up.
We are all aware of the enormous complexity of the project embarked upon, but nobody 
should ignore just how much is at stake for Europe and its integration process.
28.6.2013.
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